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AbstrAct
Studies on the political impact of protest mobilization 
sometimes show that disruptive protests help social 
movements achieve their goals. This is conventionally 
explained by politicians’ interests in re-elections and so-
cial control, ultimately neglecting alternative arguments 
such as the drive for better policy solutions. This study 
investigates if well-reasoned arguments – measured by 
the deliberative quality of protest letters against school 
closures – persuade Swedish municipal decision-makers 
more than simple outcries. Analysis demonstrates sup-
port for this argument, as schools defended by protest 
letters with a higher deliberative quality have higher prob-
ability to remain open than schools defended by letters 
of a lower deliberative quality. However, a fundamental 
paradox rises from the second conclusion: intrinsically 
non-deliberate forms of protests, such as demonstra-
tions, have a stronger negative effect on the likelihood of 
school closures. Hence, well-reasoned communicative 
practices have some power of persuasion, but experi-
enced activists may prefer disruptive protests for more 
political leverage. 
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resumen
Los estudios sobre el impacto político de la movilización 
de protesta muestran que a veces las protestas disrup-
tivas ayudan a los movimientos sociales a alcanzar sus 
objetivos. Esto se explica convencionalmente por los in-
tereses de los políticos en la reelección y el control social, 
dejando de lado en última instancia argumentos alterna-
tivos tales como la búsqueda de mejores soluciones en 
términos de mejores políticas. Este artículo investiga si 
los argumentos bien razonados - medidos por la calidad 
deliberativa de cartas de protesta contra el cierre de las 
escuelas - persuaden más que los simples gritos a los 
responsables municipales en Suecia. El análisis apo-
ya este argumento puesto que las escuelas defendidas 
por cartas de protesta con una calidad superior de deli-
beración tienen una mayor probabilidad de permanecer 
abiertas que las escuelas defendidas por cartas de una 
calidad deliberativa inferior. Sin embargo, surge una pa-
radoja fundamental a partir de la segunda conclusión: 
las formas intrínsecamente no deliberadas de protestas, 
como las manifestaciones, tienen un efecto negativo más 
fuerte sobre la probabilidad de cierre de las escuelas. 
Por lo tanto, las prácticas comunicativas bien razonadas 
tienen cierto poder de persuasión, pero los activistas ex-
perimentados pueden preferir protestas disruptivas como 
medio para obtener más influencia política.
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IntroductIon
Many studies on the political consequences of a 
social movement’s mobilization have shown that ac-
tivists are more likely to achieve their goals if their 
protests pose significant costs for decision-makers, 
their claims enjoy some public support or they have 
powerful political allies (see reviews in Amenta et al. 
2010, Giugni 1998, Uba 2009). Although the mecha-
nisms that explain how and why protests lead to po-
litical change continue to be discussed, there are two 
dominant explanations. The first refers to the elec-
toral interest of decision-makers, who see protests 
as a signal for changing public opinion (Lohmann 
1993). The second explanation refers to social con-
trol theories and is related to authorities’ interest in 
stability (Fording 2001). Decision-makers’ respon-
siveness is thereby explained by the coercive power 
of protests, while the activists’ power of persuasion 
is often neglected (but see Andrews 2001, McCam-
mon 2009). If we assume that politicians are policy 
seekers as much as they are vote seekers (Ström 
and Müller 1999), and that social movements could 
provide these policy seekers with the invaluable in-
formation about the benefits of a particular policy pro-
posal (Mansbridge 1992, Burstein and Hirsh 2007), 
then studies on political consequences of social 
movements should examine both the coercive and 
persuasive capacity of protest mobilization. 
By focusing on protest letters, and particularly on 
the deliberative quality of arguments used in these 
letters, this study investigates how activists opposing 
school closures in Swedish municipalities achieved 
their goals. Several prior studies have examined pro-
test mobilization as “communicative practices” (Batel 
and Castro 2014) and have emphasized that particu-
lar framing strategies are needed for movements to 
achieve their goals (Cress and Snow 2000, McCam-
mon et al. 2007, McCammon et al. 2001, McVeight 
et al. 2003, Trumpy 2008). Although valuable and 
important, these studies may not account for the full 
persuasive potential of activists’ claims (cf. McCam-
mon 2009). By focusing on the political and cultural 
resonance of frames, some specific characteristics 
of communication, such as openness to dialogue 
or tone, are left aside. I propose that by using the 
framework of public deliberation and evaluating the 
deliberative quality of activists’ claims, we can better 
account for the persuasiveness of these claims and 
gain a deeper understanding of how social move-
ments achieve political change. 
Although coercion via protesting has sometimes 
been seen as incompatible with the ideals of delib-
eration (see Mendonca and Ercan 2015), protests 
could be part of deliberative systems (Parkinson and 
Mansbridge 2012). As Iris Marion Young (2001:688) 
explains: “Processes of engaged and responsible 
democratic communication include street demon-
strations and sit-ins, musical works, and cartoons, 
as much as parliamentary speeches and letters to 
the editor”. Considering that such deliberative com-
munication is expected to result in legitimate policies 
(Habermas 1996), it is reasonable to expect that well-
reasoned arguments should have more persuasive 
power than simple outcries, in other words protests 
with little deliberative quality. 
This study empirically tests this proposal via a 
careful analysis of 117 school closure processes in 
11 Swedish municipalities during the period of 2000-
2010. Municipal governments often argue that they 
need to close one or several primary schools be-
cause of the declining numbers of pupils or the lack 
of resources. These proposals are prepared by bu-
reaucrats and then discussed and decided upon by 
municipal politicians. Very often the proposals face 
fierce opposition from affected pupils, their parents, 
teachers, and the local community. Activists use a 
variety of strategies from sending protest letters to 
politicians and newspapers to petitions and more 
contentious actions such as demonstrations or illegal 
school strikes. Similar conflicts over school closures 
also take place in the U.S., U.K., New Zealand, Can-
ada, and Germany (Bartl 2015, Basu 2002, Bondi 
1988, Witten et al. 2003). 
The Swedish right-of-access principle provided the 
opportunity to get access to all protest letters activists 
sent to local authorities in the 11 selected municipali-
ties. Hence, it was possible to evaluate their delibera-
tive quality and to systematically relate these letters 
to the proposals and decisions on school closures. 
Although Sweden’s political system is open to social 
movements’ mobilization (Kitschelt 1986), it is rela-
tively closed to the impact of social movements on 
national politics (Kolb 2007). At the municipal level, 
however, the openness of the Swedish political struc-
ture to the impact of social movements is compara-
ble to that of other countries. Hence, the results pre-
sented in this study may also be applicable outside 
of Sweden and in other cases of local level conflicts, 
such as windmill construction or hospital closures.
the Power of PersuAsIon And coercIon
Social movements participate in the process of 
public deliberation. They can put direct pressure on 
decision-makers by using various forms of protests, 
but they can also try to convince decision-makers 
of the merits of their policy proposals. Social move-
ments have the power of coercion and persuasion 
(Andrews 2001). While coercion is related to the dis-
ruptive character of protest events – demonstrations, 
strikes or riots, persuasion is related to the arguments 
used by activists during a mobilization. Although both 
aspects are important for achieving political and so-
cial change, prior theoretical developments and em-
pirical analysis have more frequently focused on the 
aspect of coercion (reviews in Amenta et al. 2010, 
Bosi et al. 2016). 
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The studies that focus on the persuasive capacity 
of social movements use mainly the framing approach 
(e.g., Cress and Snow 2000, McVeight et al. 2004). 
Framing in this context is defined as a discursive pro-
cess of strategic actors using symbolic resources to 
participate in collective sense-making with regard to 
public policy issues (Gamson 1996). Frames are “a 
set of interpretative packages that give meaning to 
an issue” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:3). Social 
movements can use a variety of frames and these 
could also change over time. Sometimes move-
ments use only a diagnostic frame, which refers to 
the problem and the actors to blame, while at other 
time points of diagnostic frames are combined with 
prognostic frames, which explain what needs to be 
done in order to remedy the current problem (Benford 
and Snow 2000). The framing process is important 
for mobilization, as well as for achieving social and 
political change. It has been shown that coherent and 
well-articulated diagnostic and prognostic frames 
help movements attain their goals if there is some 
cultural and political resonance between the frames 
used by movements and the existing frames (Cress 
and Snow 2000, McCammon et al. 2007, McCam-
mon et al. 2001, McVeight et al. 2003). Resonance 
means that the frames must relate to decision-mak-
ers’ core beliefs, values and attitudes. 
Although cultural and political resonance are im-
portant, communicative practices such as protest let-
ters also have other characteristics that might make 
some protest letters more persuasive than others. 
For instance, in lobbying literature it is widely ac-
knowledged that advocacy groups provide decision-
makers with information otherwise unavailable (Dür 
2008), and such information is positively related 
to advocacy groups’ goal attainment in the case of 
school closures (Larsson Taghizadeh 2015). Stud-
ies on political communication add that the way of 
presenting this information also matters, as framing 
information as a credible argument improves per-
suasiveness of the message (Chong and Druckman 
2007). The same is found by research on delibera-
tive democracy and opinion formation (Gerber et 
al. 2014, Gross 2008). Therefore, in order to better 
explain how social movements achieve their goals 
we must go beyond the analysis of diagnostic and 
prognostic frames and examine how well-reasoned 
the movements’ arguments are and how this relates 
to their political achievements. 
McCammon (2009) adopted a similar approach for 
evaluating the persuasive capacity of the women’s 
jury movements in the U.S. She found empirical evi-
dence for an argument that a movement’s frames that 
(1) show the problem as a serious one and having 
broad social consequences, (2) are well articulated 
and include a “because” clause, and (3) have empiri-
cal credibility have more persuasive power than mes-
sages without such qualities (McCammon 2001:59). 
This approach is a great step further, but it neglects 
some aspects of communication that are considered 
particularly important in the studies of deliberative 
democracy, namely the idea of consensus formation 
and search for a common good (see Mansbridge et 
al. 2006). Hence, in addition to rationality, which could 
be measured as well articulated or well reasoned ar-
guments, the legitimacy and thereby persuasiveness 
of protest messages also requires the proposal of al-
ternative solutions, all of which should be presented 
in a way that opens dialogue (Öberg and Uba 2014). 
This proposal might seem unexpected for those fa-
miliar with the antagonism between protests and the 
process of deliberation (see review in Dodge 2015). 
An activist could be rather similar to a deliberative 
democrat in his longing for justice, but in contrast to 
a deliberative democrat he is often angry, frustrated, 
and would opt for other tactics than discussing ar-
gumentatively with the policy-makers (Younf 2001). 
This might be true on many occasions, but several 
recent empirical investigations have demonstrated 
that activists can use well-articulated and well-rea-
soned arguments (Dodge 2015, McCammon 2009). 
Especially in the case of protests against school 
closures, Öberg and Uba (2015) demonstrated that 
activists use protest letters with varying degrees of 
deliberative quality. The last was measured through 
well-reasoned arguments, supporting these argu-
ments with a legitimate source (official document, 
media or academic publication), providing alternative 
solutions to the problem at hand, using a friendly tone 
and being open to dialogue. Considering this and the 
presented prior studies on political consequences of 
a social movement’s mobilization, I expect to find that 
the protests against school closures are more likely 
to attain their goals if activists use arguments that 
have a high degree of deliberative quality. 
However, policy-makers are vote seekers as much 
as policy seekers and therefore protesting could also 
influence policy-makers thanks to its coercive charac-
ter. It has been shown that activists whose protests 
generate higher disruption costs have a higher likeli-
hood to achieve their goals (Luders 2010). In contrast 
to being persuaded by the better argument, decision-
makers rationally compare the costs of disruption, that 
is the damage caused by protests or the loss of votes 
in future elections, with the costs of concession. The 
costs of concession, in turn, are dependent on spe-
cific policy decisions. In the case of school closures 
it would mean that local authorities keep the school 
open and cover the related economic costs. This 
might mean cuts in some other areas or a tax rise. 
Thus, the disruptive or costly protests such as dem-
onstrations, strikes or large petitions might achieve 
political change even though these actions tend to 
present claims with low deliberative quality. There-
fore, mobilization demonstrations, strikes or large pe-
titions will be accounted for in the following analysis. 
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While movement activism plays an important role 
in the process of policy change, the political con-
sequences of social movements are dependent on 
political context (Amenta et al. 2010). Having politi-
cal allies, that is enjoying support of a political par-
ty in power, increases the political influence of the 
movements (Giugni 2005, Meyer and Minkoff 2004). 
Similarly, public support for a movement’s goals has 
also been shown to increase the likelihood of achiev-
ing those goals because the electoral costs of such 
mobilization are higher (Amenta et al. 2005, Burst-
ein and Linton 2002, Uba 2009). Public support for 
movements’ claims is important for sustaining mo-
bilization, but movements can also gain public sup-
port as a result of mobilization and this might amplify 
the political impact of mobilization (Agnone 2007). 
Although allies and public opinion are potentially im-
portant for the mobilization against school closures 
or the decisions regarding school closures, these will 
not be accounted for in the following empirical analy-
sis for two reasons. Firstly, there was no single politi-
cal party seen as an ally to activists against school 
closures in the Swedish municipalities. Opposition 
parties often opposed closures, but as soon as the 
party came to power the disapproval of anti-school 
protests among the politicians increased regardless 
of the ideological leaning of their party (Uba 2016). 
Secondly, considering the numerous protests against 
school closures in Sweden since the early 1990s 
(Ibid.), there is probably a general public opposition 
to school closures, and therefore it is likely that activ-
ists enjoy public support regardless of the school or 
municipality of interest. 
In addition to allies and public opinion, there are 
also more structural factors such as the political op-
portunity structure, which influences social move-
ments’ ability to achieve policy change (Amenta et 
al. 1992, Kriesi et al. 1995, Kolb 2007, Meyer and 
Minkoff 2004). The Swedish political system is said 
to be relatively open to social movement mobiliza-
tion (Kitchelt 1986) and relatively closed to the politi-
cal impact of social movements at the national level 
(Kolb 2007). However, the traditional characteristics 
of political opportunity structure, such as federalism, 
bicameralism, executive-legislative relationship, are 
rather used for comparing countries than municipali-
ties. Eisinger (1973), in his classical study of protests 
and political opportunities, suggested that the formal 
structure of local governments (cities) is to be ac-
counted for, but there would not be any variation of 
that structure in the Swedish case (Bäck 2008). 
However, other factors such as the closeness 
of elections could encourage protest mobilization, 
as well as make the local authorities more vulner-
able to changes in the public mood (Burstein and 
Linton 2002). Hence, this, as well as other factors 
that might affect the decisions on school closures, 
should be accounted for in the study of protest im-
pact on policy change, and are further discussed in 
the section introducing the control variables used in 
the empirical analysis.
the cAse of school closures In sweden
The major wave of school closures started in Swe-
den in the early 1990s, just after municipalities re-
ceived the right to make decisions on school financ-
ing. Since then local authorities have closed about 
600 schools and threatened to close a further 1245 
schools, and the process has faced more than 1300 
protest events. Municipal authorities propose school 
closures because of economic difficulties, decreas-
ing number of pupils, or problems with the quality of 
teaching (Björklund et al. 2004). The schools threat-
ened with closure are identified by bureaucrats, but 
local politicians who have a seat in school commit-
tees or educational affairs make the final decision. 
The committees include representatives from all po-
litical parties that have a seat in local parliament, and 
the power balance is the same as in local parliament. 
The head of the committee comes from the govern-
ing party and as the decision affects the budget of the 
municipality, the entire municipal parliament can vote 
in favor or in opposition of the proposal. 
The process usually takes time as the affected par-
ties – the teachers, pupils and their parents – need to 
be informed of the changes such as the name of the 
new school or the changed modes of transportation. 
Parents, pupils and teachers usually learn about the 
proposal or the threat of closure directly from school 
representatives or via the media. Protests against 
the proposal are, as noted, frequent, and often mo-
tivated by parents’ unwillingness to send their chil-
dren to larger schools further away. The strategies 
involve demonstrations and illegal school strikes, in 
other words refusing to send pupils to school, as well 
as petitions, letters and emails sent directly to the re-
sponsible committee. 
This study is based on the cases of 118 threat-
ened schools from 11 municipalities, of which 67 
(57%) were closed by the end of 2010. Ideally, one 
would examine all 290 Swedish municipalities that 
proposed and implemented school closures since 
1991, but due to practical reasons only 11 munici-
palities1 were chosen. Considering that the selected 
municipalities include both smaller and larger munici-
palities, larger cities (Gothenburg), and mainly rural 
areas (Falun), the selection bias should be relatively 
small. Looking at the political rule of these munici-
palities, there are those traditionally ruled by Social 
Democrats (Falun), as well as those where the in-
cumbent coalition has changed after the elections in 
2002 or 2006 (e.g., Uppsala). 
Data on schools threatened with closure and those 
closed in the selected municipalities were collected 
within the framework of a larger research project 
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and involved two processes (see Larsson Tagizadeh 
2016, Uba 2016). Firstly, every Swedish municipal-
ity was asked to report the list of schools they have 
threatened to close, and provide information on the 
year of the proposal and the schools’ closure, if that 
was the case. Only 60% of the municipalities re-
sponded, and therefore the same information was 
searched for in Sweden’s national and local newspa-
pers, national newswire (TT), public TV and radio, as 
well as municipal websites. This process also gave 
us information about the protests related to these 
particular proposed closures. It was only in the case 
of 38 schools (32%) out of the examined 118 schools 
that we did not find any information about visible pro-
tests such as petitions, protests during public meet-
ings with policy-makers, demonstrations or school 
strikes. The rest of the schools had at least one 
protest event, and four schools (Brantingskola, Mell-
ringeskola, Norrehedskola, and Gustav Adolf school) 
had more than six protests. The main activists were 
pupils, their parents and on fewer occasions teach-
ers or small village organizations. Petitions, letters to 
newspapers and protests in public meetings domi-
nated, but there were also 20 more disruptive events 
such as demonstrations (12), illegal school strikes 
(5), and large petitions (3).
Traditional studies on the political influence of 
social movement mobilization would have stopped 
here and focused only on visible protest events. This 
might be misleading not only because media-based 
protests data suffer from several biases (Ortiz et al. 
2005), but because activists often turn to authorities 
via direct (invisible) channels such as letters, emails, 
petitions or phone calls. This obviously depends on 
the case and country, but in Sweden the tradition 
of contacting policy-makers, especially at the local 
level, is very strong (Kriesi and Westholm 2007). 
Consequently, all 11 municipalities were contacted 
a second time, requesting all material activists had 
sent them with regard to school closures (see Lars-
son Tagizadeh 2016). This resulted in 324 letters, 
postcards, emails, and petitions, which were sent in 
against the proposed closure of 55 different schools 
(16 petitions, 160 shorter emails and letters, 148 lon-
ger emails or letters). The majority of the letters were 
sent by one individual or family (42%), while neigh-
borhood groups and other civil society organizations 
sent in about 29% of the letters, and school teachers 
and personnel sent about 7% of the letters. While let-
ters generally do not differ much across these groups, 
there are two interesting patterns: pupils tend to send 
postcards and drawings, and community groups of-
ten send long letters with a detailed analysis. 
The letters are not equally distributed between 
these 55 schools. While Karlslundsskola in Örebro 
municipality had 32 letters, the average number per 
school was eight and seven schools only had one 
letter. Interestingly, for 10 out of these 55 schools 
we did not have any information about the visible 
protests. This demonstrates the bias scholars might 
have when relying only on newspaper data on protest 
actions. On the other hand, for 34 schools for which 
we had recorded some information about visible pro-
tests, the municipalities had not received or archived 
any protest letters. The case clearly shows the im-
portance of triangulation of data sources for protest 
event analysis, previously emphasized by many 
scholars (see e.g., Hutter 2014). Due to these differ-
ences in data, but also due to the fact that disruptive 
protests tend to bear slogans rather than well-rea-
soned arguments, the empirical analysis of protests’ 
impact on politicians’ decisions over school closures 
uses two sets of schools: all 118 schools and the 55 
schools that received at least one protest letter. The 
last set is more useful for evaluating which letters - 
those with higher or lower deliberative quality - have 
more political leverage. 
meAsurIng the delIberAtIve quAlIty of 
Protest letters
One research assistant carefully read and ana-
lyzed the content of all 324 letters that opposed the 
proposed closure of a particular school or schools.2 
Some authors just stated their opposition, others 
asked for further investigations, and a few provided 
a list of alternative proposals. The letters that were 
sent to a municipality after politicians had decided on 
a closure are not included, as these cannot influence 
the decision. The deliberative quality of the letters is 
evaluated on the basis of the method proposed by 
Öberg and Uba (2015). They suggest that a letter has 
a high deliberative quality if it: (1) uses well-reasoned 
arguments; (2) uses any reference to some official 
document or media source for legitimating these ar-
guments; (3) presents alternative solutions; (4) uses 
a friendly tone; and (5) is open for discussion. 
The first criterion simply measures whether the 
protest letter includes any reasoned arguments in 
addition to the stated opinions or if it is a simple out-
cry. A small proportion, about 9%, of all letters did 
not include any reasoned arguments and just stated: 
“We want to keep the Alby-school!” (ID1); “Please do 
not close Jakobgårds-school!” (ID102); or “Save the 
school in Kortedala!” (ID345). Sixty percent of the let-
ters included one to four clearly stated arguments, 
and the remaining 30% listed more than five argu-
ments against the proposed school closure. The ar-
guments varied but usually involved some diagnostic 
and prognostic framing, and referred to different per-
ceived consequences of the process. 
For instance, about one-fifth of the letters ex-
plained that pupils would face higher risks related 
to traffic and would have long traveling times to and 
from school: “The proposal means that our children 
must daily cross the railway and a very busy road.” 
(ID 50); “The proposal means that I have to say 
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or threatening tone. Many letters used threats such 
as stating that activists would never vote for govern-
ing politicians or for their party, threatening to move 
to another municipality or to open a new independent 
school. In total, about 54% of all letters had a friendly 
tone and were open for a dialogue.
As a result of the content analysis, it was possible 
to calculate an additional index of deliberative qual-
ity for every examined letter. The index (DI) varies 
between 0 to 4, where 0 refers to a letter without any 
arguments, 1 to a letter with at least one or more ar-
guments, 2 to a letter with arguments supported by 
a source, 3 to a letter with arguments, source, and 
alternative, and 4 to a letter with arguments, source, 
alternatives and friendly tone/openness to dialogue. 
In many cases there were several letters per school, 
and therefore every school got its aggregate mean 
value of deliberative index. Three schools had letters 
with the lowest level of deliberative quality (0), while 
six schools achieved the maximum value (4), and 
the average deliberative index for all 55 schools was 
2.63. If we assume that other protest actions present 
messages with low deliberative quality, then among 
all of the 61 schools that had at least one protest 
event or at least one protest letter, the average delib-
erative quality is a bit lower – 2.12.
control vArIAbles
It was noted above that the structure of local gov-
ernment, political allies and public support for activ-
ists against school closures in Sweden is likely to be 
the same across the municipalities and threatened 
schools. Although some local politicians agreed with 
activists and supported their claims against the pro-
posed closure, no single political party dominated. The 
issues appeared to be more pragmatic than ideologi-
cal. When the Social Democratic Party proposed a clo-
sure in one municipality, it opposed it in another, due to 
the fact that it was in opposition in the latter. The same 
applied to the Conservative (Moderaterna) or Liberal 
party (Folkpartiet). Local politics in Sweden do not 
have to follow the national trends, and therefore there 
are municipalities where Social Democrats cooperate 
with the Center Party, although at the national level 
the parties belong to different coalitions. With respect 
to public opinion, there is currently a lack of opinion 
poll data about the issue, but the numerous protests 
against the proposed closures suggest that the public 
is more opposed to than in favor of the closures. 
One political context variable is however included 
and this relates to elections. It is likely that schools pro-
posed for closure during election years have a higher 
probability to remain open due to increased political 
conflict, and it is also easier to mobilize protests dur-
ing times of high instability (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). 
During the examined period of 2000-2010, there were 
three municipal elections: 2002, 2006 and 2010. Of 
all the 118 schools, 24 (20%) were threatened during 
… Goodbye to my children who will die in the next 
dreadful bus accident! No!” (ID 403); or “The schools 
must remain! Otherwise all children need to take a 
bus to school!” (ID46). 
Other common arguments referred to: the quality 
of education and larger classes ― “Have you really 
thought about ‘overpopulating’ other schools, which 
already suffer from too many pupils, with children 
from [X]-school?” (ID 74); loss of village center and 
negative effects for the rural community ― “We need 
the [X]-school to keep our village alive and for the se-
curity of all children who live today and will live in the 
region in the future!” (ID 58); or to lacking democracy 
in the decision-making procedures ― “The decision 
is being rushed, seemingly only because you want to 
minimize the number of protests!” (ID 67). Many let-
ters combined different arguments, but from the per-
spective of deliberative quality we measured only on 
the presence or lack of reasoned arguments. 
The second criterion requires that activists support 
their arguments with some legitimate source of infor-
mation such as their own investigation, official docu-
ments or media reports (Öberg and Uba 2015). The 
information provided by activists might be something 
decision-makers have not considered before (e.g., new 
economic calculations), but they also might provide 
new interpretation of existing knowledge. About one-
third of the letters supported their arguments by refer-
ring to a legitimate source, be it their own investigation 
or official documents. For example, an argument about 
traffic safety was legitimized by referring to a national 
road agency: “According to the Swedish Road Admin-
istration almost half of the accidents involving children 
take place when they cross the road” (ID 200). 
The third criterion requires the presentation of al-
ternative proposals, which is important because bu-
reaucrats and policy-makers often present their argu-
ments as if there were no other alternative to closure. 
The proposed alternatives varied from statements 
such as “Demolish school B instead; it is in a bad 
shape anyway!” (ID180) to some more constructive 
ones like “Integrate a pre-school with our school and 
thereby save it!” (ID 411). About 36% of the letters 
included some alternative proposals.
Finally, we had to collapse the fourth and fifth cri-
terion because letters that had a friendly tone were 
also open for a dialogue. The tone of the examined 
letters varies from that of polite and bureaucratic 
formulations to hate letters and emotional pleas. 
For example: “For God’s sake, do not close the [X]-
school, the decision is hasty and unconsidered!” (ID 
118); “Hi you bloody politicians! … We hate you!” (ID 
203); or “Please, please save our school!” (ID 36). 
Although recent studies on deliberative systems are 
more open to the use of emotions in the process of 
deliberations (Mansbridge et al. 2006), I would argue 
that a friendly tone refers to more equality, inclusive-
ness and search for consensus rather than an upset 
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one of these years. Ideally one would also take into 
account many socio-economic details about the mu-
nicipalities, but considering the relatively few numbers 
of units of analysis it is important to keep the num-
ber of variables low. Hence, I simply opt for a simple 
model that accounts for the intra-municipal variation 
by using clustered standard errors. 
The characteristics of schools might affect protest 
mobilization as well as the decisions on school clo-
sures. Therefore the analysis includes two school 
related variables. Firstly, the distance of the school 
threatened with closure from the closest remaining 
school (in kilometers). Closing a school in a remote 
area means longer traveling times for pupils and 
could be a strong incentive for mobilization. Similarly, 
the costs of transportation might be relatively high 
in comparison to the savings the municipality earns 
from closing the school premises. The distance be-
tween the threatened and the closest remaining 
school is calculated with the help of GPS coordi-
nates for all schools in the examined municipalities, 
not only those threatened by closure, and the lists 
and addresses are taken from the Swedish School 
Board’s database. Distance varies from 23 meters to 
31 kilometers and has an average of 2.63 km. 
Smaller schools should be easier to close as fewer 
pupils need a place in new schools, and one can ex-
pect that the opposition to closure by parents is also 
smaller. Prior studies have shown that Swedish mu-
nicipalities often close small rural schools because 
of economic reasons or due to the lack of pupils and 
children in the area (Åberg-Bengtsson 2009). How-
ever, the number of pupils in the schools threatened 
with closure3 has a very strong correlation with the 
school’s distance from the remaining school. As the 
distance is a more accurate measure than the num-
ber of pupils, the following analysis only accounts for 
the distance between the threatened and the closest 
remaining school. 
The second school-specific variable indicates 
whether the schools were supposed to be closed en-
tirely or only partially, that is only some classes were 
planned to be closed. Information comes from the 
same source as the information about the closures. 
Out of 118 schools, 20 were proposed to be closed 
only partially (17%). 
Finally, protest letters are not the only form of mo-
bilization against proposed school closures, and as 
was noted above activists also used other forms of 
protests. Disruptive events were expected to have 
more political leverage than non-disruptive pro-
tests, and therefore we use a dichotomous measure 
that takes into consideration if any demonstrations, 
strikes or very large petitions (more than 1,000 sig-
natures) were used against the closure of the particu-
lar school. There are 20 such schools (17%) in our 
full set of 118 schools, while 14 in the sample of 55 
schools had at least one protest letter.
results And dIscussIon 
The analysis is done with the help of simple logis-
tic analysis that accounts for the fact that schools are 
nested in 11 municipalities by clustering standard er-
rors. The dependent variable is a dichotomous mea-
sure of whether the school was open (0) or closed (1) 
at the end of 2010.4 The goal is to test whether the 
deliberative quality of the protest letters and disrup-
tive protests relate to the probability of closure when 
we account for the above-listed control variables. 
Table 1 presents the results of four different models.
Table 1. 
Probability of school closures (maximum likelihood coefficients from a logit analysis)
Baseline Baseline +protests 
Schools with 
at least one 
protest
Schools with at 
least one protest 
letter
Distance (km) -0.10 (.05)* -0.12 (.06)** -0.15 (.09) -0.13 (.09)
Partial closure -0.45 (.38) -0.41 (.40) -0.56 (.52) -0.89 (.50)
Election year  1.58 (.55)**  1.60 (.55)**  0.99 (.72)  0.64 (.79)
Any disruptive protests -1.03 (.32)*** -1.33 (.54)** -0.88 (.73)
Deliberative quality of 
protest letters -0.29 (.27) -0.85 (.20)***
Constant 0.37 (.27) 0.60(.32)* 1.41 (.72)* 2.98 (.95)**
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.17
N 118 118 61 55
Note: ordinary logistic model with clustered standard errors for 11 municipalities, numbers in parentheses are standard errors, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05.
RIS  [online] 2016, 74 (4), e046. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ris.2016.74.4.046
8 . KATRIN UBA
The first three models use all 118 schools and the 
fourth model uses only the limited set of the sample, 
which are the schools that have at least one protest 
letter. The first baseline model demonstrates that the 
probability of school closures is related to distance 
from those schools remaining open. Interestingly, the 
effect of elections is unexpected, as schools that were 
threatened by closure during the municipal elections 
years (2002 or 2006) are more likely to be closed 
than to remain open. National elections in Sweden 
are held on the same day (in early September) as 
municipal elections. The reason for the aforemen-
tioned negative effect might be the fact that several 
schools were threatened with closure before Sep-
tember and these were quickly closed, probably in 
order to avoid election-related discussions and pos-
sibly because the party in power might lose its incum-
bent position as a result of the elections. This was the 
case for 17 of the 20 schools that were threatened 
during the election years. More detailed information 
about the dates when the decision to threaten and 
close a school would take place is necessary for out-
lining whether the closures took place before or after 
elections. Nevertheless, such fast processes also de-
crease the opportunities for activists to protest. 
The second model adds the variable of disruptive 
protest events for measuring the effect of coercion 
on school closures. It demonstrates that there is a 
clear negative effect of disruptive protests, as the 
schools that were defended by strikes, demonstra-
tions or very large petitions have a lower probability 
to be closed. I have also tested to check if disruptive 
and non-disruptive protests have a similar negative 
effect on closures, but there was no support for this 
model (results are not shown, but available upon re-
quest). Demonstrations, strikes and large petitions 
that constitute disruptive strategies in this study were 
also used in combination with other less disruptive 
forms of protests. Hence, the effect of this variable 
could also refer to the importance of intensity of pro-
tests. The results are similar to findings of several 
prior studies, which show that disruptive tactics help 
movements attain their goals (Piven and Cloward 
1979, Gamson 1990, Luders 2010). 
The third model adds the deliberative quality of the 
protest letters. All schools that received no protest let-
ters have the value zero for this variable, and here it 
is important to limit the sample of schools to those 
having at least one protest action (61 schools of 118). 
There is no significant relationship between closures 
and the quality of deliberation, while the effect of dis-
ruptive protests continues to be significant. The re-
sults are the same if we use the full sample of 118 
schools. This suggests that in the case of school clo-
sures the coercion or the electoral costs imposed by 
the activists are more important than the persuasion. 
Still, if activists choose to send protest letters, what 
kinds of letters are the most persuasive? The final 
model in Table 1 provides the answer and the results 
are also portrayed in Figure 1. Schools that were de-
fended by the letters with a higher deliberative quality 
have a significantly lower probability of closure than 
the schools without such letters. This is in accordance 
with the results presented by McCammon (2009) for 
a very different movement and country, and suggests 
that well-reasoned arguments presented with some 
legitimizing source, which also propose alternative 
solutions to the problem and present it in a way that 
allows for dialogue have more persuasive capac-
ity than simple statements of opposition or outcries. 
Using highly deliberative arguments does not always 
guarantee the attainment of activists’ goals, but the 
probability to achieve the goals is twice higher if out-
cry is replaced by reasoning, friendly tone and alter-
native arguments (see Figure 1). As protest letters 
could be used together with disruptive events such as 
demonstrations, I even tested the probable interac-
tion effect. However, when activists use both disrup-
tive protests and messages with a high deliberative 
quality, this does not have any significant effect on 
school closures (model not shown, but available upon 
request). Hence, it seems likely that the mechanisms 
of coercion and persuasion do not work simultane-
ously; rather they are independent from each other.
Figure 1. 
Probability of school closure and deliberative quality 
of protest letters
conclusIon
The results of this study might be seen as tenta-
tive, due to the limited number of units in this analysis 
and because the case of school closures in Sweden 
may be a relatively specific one. On the other hand, 
the process of school closures does not differ greatly 
from other cases which involve various local level 
conflicts, such as the placement of energy projects 
(McAdam and Boudet 2012). Hence, the results give 
us a good reason to expect that the deliberative qual-
ity of protest messages increases the activists’ per-
suasive power. This advances our understanding of 
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the political consequences of social movement mobi-
lization, as previous studies have mainly focused on 
disruption (coercion) or framing of the argument, but 
neglected the fact that social movements or protest 
activists can provide important knowledge for policy 
seekers in a convincing way. Protest letters that in-
clude arguments that are supported by some legiti-
mate source, provide alternative solutions, and use a 
friendly tone are more persuasive than letters without 
such qualities. 
It is an important finding in two respects. Firstly, it 
supports the argument that protesting and delibera-
tion do not have to be seen as opposed, and more-
over, that protesting might also lead to some insights 
with regards to deliberation (Dodge 2015). Secondly, 
and more importantly for the research on political 
consequences of social movement mobilization, we 
must pay more attention to deciphering the persua-
sive power of protests. Some studies have proposed 
that persuasion is important (e.g., Andrews 2001) but 
have only been able to measure it as a frequency 
of contacts or strength of the organizations or move-
ments. This study has, however, demonstrated that 
that we learn more about the persuasive qualities of 
protesting when examining the claims and, more im-
portantly, the way these claims are formulated. 
Although activists, as well as politicians, often 
use claims with a low deliberative quality, we need 
to further examine in which context the use of well-
reasoned arguments may help movements to attain 
their goals. Is it only a characteristic of a relatively 
open welfare state such as Sweden, of fairly mi-
nor local questions such as school closures, and of 
cases where the public in general supports activists’ 
goals, or does the activists’ use of deliberative claims 
also benefit the environmental or civil right move-
ments in other countries? More research focusing on 
a dialogue between activists and decisions-makers 
would trace the development of these arguments. It 
could also show whether the decision-makers pick up 
the arguments presented by the activists and if that 
eventually relates to the attainment of a movement’s 
goals. This would be an important leap toward the 
demonstration of causality in protests’ impact.
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1. The selected municipalities are Boras, Borlänge, Bot-
kyrka, Falun, Gävle, Göteborg, Helsingborg, Kalmar, 
Lund, Örebro, and Uppsala. While Sweden has 290 
municipalities, only 273 of them have closed or threat-
ened any schools with a closure.
2. The coding scheme was developed and tested by the 
author and the assistant, although the coding of let-
ters was carried out by the assistant only and therefore 
no tests for intercoder reliablity have been made. All 
questionable cases were discussed, and this should 
increase the reliability of the coding. 
3. I reviewed the average number of pupils in all 118 
schools in 2002 or the closest year for which the num-
bers were available in the Swedish School Board’s da-
tabase. The number of pupils varies from 14-647. 
4. It is important to recall that we examined the closure 
decisions, not the real implementation, as sometimes 
the implementaton of the decision might require time. 
Municipalities avoid implementing their decisions in the 
middle of the school year, but they can easily decide on 
the closure in September. 
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